The signal for the opening of an accelerated and comprehensive campaign of Israeli planning and construction in East Jerusalem was given barely a week after the Annapolis Conference: On December 2, 2007 the Israel Lands Authority (ILA) published a tender for the construction of 307 residential units in the Har Homa neighborhood of East Jerusalem, and on December 31 a tender was published for the construction of 440 additional residential units in East Talpiyot. In comparison, during the first ten months of 2007 - in other words, the whole year, up until the Annapolis Conference - tenders were published for the construction of only 46 residential units in all of East Jerusalem.

During December 2007 and in the course of 2008, the Ministry of Construction and Housing and the ILA issued tenders for the construction of 1,931 residential units in East Jerusalem. Once these units are completed, about 6,750 Israeli residents will be added to the area.

In comparison to recent years, 2008 also witnessed a highly significant acceleration of the approval processes of town planning schemes as well. In 2007 not a single Israeli plan for construction in East Jerusalem was deposited for public review, a key step in the approval process. In contrast, in 2008 numerous town plans were deposited for public review, involving approval for the construction of about 5,431 residential units in Givat Hamatos, Pisgat Ze’ev, Ramot, Neveh Yaakov and Har Homa C. Similarly, in 2007 statutory plans were approved for the construction of a total of 391 residential units in the entire Israeli sector of East Jerusalem.  In contrast, in 2008 final approval was given for two construction plans (in Givat Hamatos A and in Neveh Yaakov) that allow for the construction of approximately 2,730 residential units. While statutory approvals do not necessarily equate with actual building starts, approval of these plans is an essential and concrete step toward their implementation.

During 2008, the Ministry of Construction and Housing worked intensely on three new plans in East Jerusalem: in Atarot, in northern Jerusalem; in Khirbet Mazmoriya, in the southeast of the city; and in Walaja, in the southwest corner of the city. While these plans have not yet been submitted to the authorities and the planning process has not yet formally commenced, their influence is already being felt. Their very existence serves as a pretext for the demolition of Palestinian homes in those areas, and for blocking construction plans initiated by Palestinians who live in the vicinity.

One of the patterns that characterized the Oslo process was that every ostensibly conciliatory step on the part of the Israeli government toward the Palestinians was accompanied by an inflammatory and defiant counter-move in Jerusalem. So, parallel to the approval of the 1995 Wye River agreement and the redeployment in Hebron, Netanyahu approved construction plans in Har Homa and Ras al Amud, personally sabotaging the very diplomatic process he was purporting to lead.

The concentration of the tenders and the depositing of the construction plans for public review during the first half of 2008 were hardly random. They continued despite the protests of the Palestinians and the international community, including the Bush Administration, and it seems likely that they were hastened precisely because of these protests. The construction served as a useful mechanism geared to undermine the political process, in a manner that made it difficult for those in favor of the process to intervene. In the second half of the year, these actions were no longer essential, because the Annapolis process had already been depleted of its energies.

Even if the causes of death of the Annapolis process were varied, the acceleration of construction in East Jerusalem contributed significantly and directly to its demise.